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WZB conference on “Designing and evaluating matching markets”
June 27, 2019 @ 8:00 am - June 28, 2019 @ 5:00 pm
The WZB is planning an international conference on matching markets. The conference “Designing and evaluating matching markets,” starting in the morning of June 27, 2019, and ending on June 28, 2019, will take place at the WZB in Berlin. The conference is organized by Inácio Bó (WZB), Dorothea Kübler (WZB), and Lars Ehlers (University of Montreal).
In the past two decades, the fields of matching theory and market design has seen great advances in terms of theoretical but also real-life contributions. These contributions have impacted the efficiency and organization of markets such as college admissions, school choice and organ donation. We are now seeing a growing literature on the empirical evaluation of these markets, both empirically and experimentally, in which theory is tested against the data, giving new inputs into the design of refined and novel mechanisms. At the same time, new proposals that go beyond the usual objectives of efficiency and stability are being proposed and having their merits debated.
The workshop will bring together excellent leading economists from North America, Europe and Japan to present and discuss their latest research. It will also strengthen the mutual interaction between theory, experiments and empirical researchers in matching. Finally, the workshop aims to further strengthen the field of matching market design and experimental economics in Berlin, promoting the local researchers of the field and identifying new research perspectives.
Thursday, June 27, 2019
Camille Terrier (University of Lausanne), The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
Christian Basteck (Université libre de Bruxelles), Aiding Applicants: Leveling the Playing Field within the Immediate Acceptance Mechanism
Utku M. Ünver (Boston College), Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Liver Exchange
Àgnes Cseh (Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Pareto optimal coalitions of fixed size
Morimitsu Kurino (Keio University), Designing market structure in matching problems
Lars Ehlers (Université de Montréal), Robust Design in Monotonic Markets: A Case for Firm-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance
Caterina Calsamiglia (Institute of Political Economy and Governance (IPEG)), The design of university entrance exams and its implications for gender gaps
Madhav Raghavan (University of Lausanne), Transparency of Centralised Allocation Mechanisms
Friday, June 28, 2019
Julien Grenet (Paris School of Economics), Decentralizing Centralized Matching Markets: Implications from Early Offers in University Admissions
Ran Shorrer (Penn State University), Simultaneous Search: Beyond Independent Successes
Rustamdjan Hakimov (University of Lausanne), Pick-an-object mechanisms
Thilo Klein and Robert Aue (ZEW), Gains from Integration in School Choice
Alexander Nesterov (Higher School of Economics, St.Petersburg), Minimal envy and popular matchings
Marek Pycia (University of Zurich), Invariance and Matching Market Outcomes
M. Oguz Afacan (Sabanci University), College Admissions with Tuition Transfers
Bettina Klaus (University of Lausanne), Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices