This section of our website collects abstracts of recent research papers on matching by MiP members. A link is provided to the authors’ website for the full paper. To submit a paper please send the title, an abstract, keywords and a link to your webpage where the paper is posted to

2017Broadening the market design approach to school choice Estelle Cantillonschool choice, market design, policy
2017An Invitation to Market Design Scott Duke Kominers, Alexander Teytelboym, and Vincent P. CrawfordMatching, auctions, trading, scrip, liquidity, efficiency, equity, allocation rules, marketplaces, market design
2017Manipulability and Tie-Breaking in Constrained School Choice
Benoit Decerf and Martin Van der Linden School choice, Dominant strategy, Undominated strategy, Manipulability, Stability, Tie-breaking, Boston mechanism, Deferred acceptance mechanism
2017A Criterion to Compare Mechanisms When Solutions Are Not Unique, with Applications to Constrained School Choice
Benoit Decerf and Martin Van der LindenMultiple solutions, School choice, Stability, Boston mechanism, Deferred acceptance mechanism, Nash equilibrium, Undominated strategy
2016The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
Julien Combe, Olivier Tercieux and Camille TerrierTwo-sided matching markets, Teacher Assignment, Fairness, Efficiency
2015The performance of school assignment mechanisms in practice
Monique de Haan, Pieter Gautier, Hessel Oosterbeek, Bas van der KlaauwSchool choice; Boston mechanism, deferred acceptance mechanism, strategic behavior, ex-ante efficiency, ex-post efficiency
2015Self-selection in School Choice: Theory and Evidence from Mexico City High School Match
Li Chen and Juan Sebastián PereyraSchool choice, Incomplete Information, Self-selection, Serial Dictatorship Mechanism,
2015Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice
Gabrielle Fack, Julien Grenet, and Yinghua HeGale-Shapley Deferred-Acceptance Mechanism, School Choice, Stable
Matching, Student Preferences, Admission Criteria
2015Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement
José Alcalde and Antonio Romero-MedinaSchool Choice Problem, Fair Matching, Strategy-Proofness
2014The Naive versus the Adaptive Boston Mechanism Timo Mennle and Sven SeukenBoston mechanism, School Choice, Strategyproofness, Partial Strategyproofness, Efficiency
2014College Admissions with Entrance Exams: Centralized versus Decentralized Isa E. Hafalir, Rustamdjan Hakimov, Dorothea Kübler and Morimitsu KurinoCollege admissions, Incomplete information, Student welfare, Contests, All-pay auctions, Experiment
2014A new solution for the roommate problem: The Q-stable matchings Péter Biró, Elena Inarra, Elena Molisroomates problem, almost stability, internal stability, stable partition, absorbing set
2014Improving College Access and Success for Low-Income Students: Evidence from a Large Need-Based Grant ProgramGabrielle Fack and Julien GrenetNeed-based grants; College enrollment; Student persistence; Degree completion, Field Data, College admissions, France.
2014Overbooking in matching markets Alex WestkampEnrollment targets, Overbooking, Cutoffs, Market clearing, Stable matchings, School Choice, Boston mechanism.
2014Dynamic allocation of objects to queueing agents Francis Bloch and David CantalaDynamic matching, Queuing, Queuing disciplines, Social housing, Organ transplant
2014Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston vs Its Alternatives Caterina Calsamiglia,
Chao Fu, and
Maia Güell
School Choice, Boston mechanism, Deferred Acceptance mechanism, Field data, Strategic behavior, Strategyproofness, Barcelona, Spain
2014College Diversity and Investment Incentives
Thomas Gall, Patrick Legros and Andrew NewmanMatching, misallocation, nontransferable utility, multidimensional attributes, affirmative action, segregation, education
2014Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems. Péter Biró, Iain McBridecollege admissions, integer programming, stable core limits, quotas, couples
2014The Hospitals / Residents Problem with Couples: Complexity and Integer Programming Models. Péter Biró, David F. Manlove, Iain McBridematching with couples, hospitals residents problem, integer programming, NP-hard
2014Gaming the Boston School Choice Mechanism in Beijing Yinghua HeBoston Mechanism, Gale-Shapley Deferred-Acceptance Mechanism, School Choice, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, Strategy-Proofness, Moment Inequalities, Beijing, China.
2014Driven by priorities manipulations under the Boston mechanism David Cantala and Juan Sebastián PereyraTwo-sided many-to-one matchings, school choice, Boston mechanism
2013Mixité sociale : le rôle des procédures d’inscription scolaire (Social diversity: the role of school choice procedure)Estelle Cantillondiversity, school choice, priorities, Belgium, Flanders, quotas
2013Preference Signaling in Matching Markets Peter Coles, Alexey Kushnir and Muriel NiederleSignaling, Cheap talk, Market design, Labor markets
2013Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets Alexey Kushnir Signaling, Cheap talk, Labor markets
2013All About Priorities? Less School Choice with bad SchoolsCaterina Calsamiglia and Antonio MirallesSchool choice, Boston mechanism, Deferred Acceptance mechanism, Priorities, Strategic behaviour, Strategyproofness
2013Matching couples with Scarf’s algorithm Péter Biró, Tamás Fleiner, Rob IrvingScarf lemma, stable allocation, hospitals residents problem, matching with couples